Tiny bit capturing how Israeli public or majority’s thinking pattern.
It is a bitter pragmatism. But -
What’s really at the core on this is -
- the subject of who should have saved Gazans
- while prohibiting Iranian regime to build up influence/foothold there
- Exactly same thing happened in southern Lebanon and to its Shia population (and Israeli people are also thinking about Hezbollah in the same way - deterrence have to be reinforced repeatedly, cyclically, over time.)
- [‘Responsibility’ - vs. interest, influence, sphere - different IR terms, ideas. How they get applied. Evolution.]
It is all too late. But I should check history of these cases much more closely. What were the limits - for the side of USA, Europe and Gulf powers. What they tried. Or they might never really tried and just looked away, or didn’t have any sufficient interest.
Sectarianism - is fatalistic thing - and we basically have no intellectual comprehension of it - nor prudent measures - or anything.
(Attention and engagement with sectarian situation, or the marginalized - if there are terrible realistic limit of international relations on these - so be it. That may well be the limit of of what we humans can really be.)
(The current IR discussions about these two locations - is somehow (miraculously?) associating these with the case of Northern Ireland - that what took place in Northern Ireland could take place in Lebanon and Gaza - that those militias could become moderate overtime - turning into a legitimate? or part of legitimate? political entity. While there are probably much more local complexity and probably ideological difference are inescapably accompanying the cases of Lebanon and Gaza.)
What is striking in listening to the Israelis discuss their predicament is how similar the debate sounds to so many previous ones, despite the changed geopolitical circumstances. In most minds here, the changes do not demand a new strategy, simply a redoubled old one.
The operative metaphor is often described as “cutting the grass,” meaning a task that must be performed regularly and has no end. There is no solution to security challenges, officials here say, only delays and deterrence. That is why the idea of one day attacking Iranian nuclear facilities, even though such an attack would set the nuclear program back only two years, is widely discussed as a reasonable option. That is why frequent raids in the West Bank and surveillance flights over Lebanon never stop.
And that is why this week’s operation in Gaza is widely viewed as having been inevitable, another painful but necessary maintenance operation that, officials here say, will doubtless not be the last.
Gazans see events in a very different light. The problem, they say, comes from Israel: Israeli drones fill the Gazan skies, Israeli gunboats strafe their waters, Palestinian militants are shot at from the air, and the Gaza border areas are declared off limits by Israel with the risk of death from Israeli gunfire.
But there is little dissent in Israel about the Gaza policy. This week leaders of the leftist opposition praised the assassination of Ahmed al-Jabari, the Hamas military commander, on Wednesday. He is viewed here as the equivalent of Osama bin Laden. The operation could go on for many days before there is any real dissent.