but we are actually all winds
ever more than before
even ever more than before 
gaining 
speeding 
booming
towards future 
speeding
and redeeming laughters
and happiest laughters
Start page JUMO | Code for America | good.is |
“If you want to free a society, just give them internet access. Because people, the young guys, you know, are all going to go out and see biased media, see the truth about other nations and their own nation and they’re going to be able to contribute and collaborate together.”
nybooks:
“ Slavs and Tatars, When Satire Conquered Iran
With an acerbic sense of humor and realist illustrations reminiscent of Daumier or Toulouse-Lautrec, the satirical magazine Molla Nasreddin (1906–1930) attacked the hypocrisy of the Muslim...

nybooks:

Slavs and Tatars, When Satire Conquered Iran

With an acerbic sense of humor and realist illustrations reminiscent of Daumier or Toulouse-Lautrec, the satirical magazine Molla Nasreddin (1906–1930) attacked the hypocrisy of the Muslim clergy, while arguing convincingly for Westernization, educational reform, and equal rights for women. It would become the most influential and perhaps first publication of its kind to be read across the Muslim world, from Morocco to India.

Needs more info - but for now from Wikipedia:

Molla Nasraddin (AzeriMolla Nəsrəddin ; Russian: Молла Насреддин) was an eight-page Azerbaijani satirical periodical published in Tiflis (from 1906 to 1917), Tabriz (in 1921) and Baku (from 1922 to 1931) in the Azeri and occasionally Russian languages. The magazine was “read across the Muslim world from Morocco to Iran.“

The periodical was founded by Jalil Mammadguluzadeh, a famous Azerbaijani writer, and published by Geyrat Publishing House owned by him. The name "Molla Nasraddin” was inspired by the 13th century Muslim clericNasreddin who was remembered for his funny stories and anecdotes. The main purpose of the magazine was to satirically depict various social phænomena, such as inequalitycultural assimilation, and corruption; and to ridicule backward lifestyles and values of the clergy and religious fanatics. In their articles, the columnists in an implicit way called upon the readers to modernize and accept more advanced Western social norms and practices.

Bold and denunciative articles were the reason for numerous searches performed by the police and frequent bans of Molla Nasraddin (in 1912, 1914 and 1917). After a three-year break, Mammadguluzadeh moved to TabrizIran, where within the next year he published eight more issues of the magazine.

The significance of Molla Nasraddin is in its development of the critical realist genre in Azerbaijani literature. It influenced similar processes in other literary traditions, primarily in Iran. Iranian cartoon art emerged as a result of publishing Molla Nasraddin in Tabriz in 1921.

Also about Nasreddin himself looks interesting. 13th century Sufi. 

“ artemisdreaming: ‘Untitled Etching’ - Pouran Jinchi (Large image: HERE)
Contributed image/MFAH. Untitled 1998 etching by Iranian artist Pouran Jinchi. On loan from the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. © Pouran Jinchi, courtesy Art...

artemisdreaming: ‘Untitled Etching’ - Pouran Jinchi (Large image:  HERE)

Contributed image/MFAH.  Untitled 1998 etching by Iranian artist Pouran Jinchi. On loan from the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. © Pouran Jinchi, courtesy Art Projects International, N.Y.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

“You should see the celebration that they do for the death of Rumi,” said Francesca Leoni, MFAH assistant curator of the Arts of the Islamic World. “It’s everything but mourning because it’s a moment of joy. It’s the moment in which your earthly boundaries are finally over, and your spiritual dimensionality reaches back to the source — to the unity that was at the beginning of time.”

Leoni is coordinating the MFAH’s presentation of Light of the Sufis: The Mystical Arts of Islam with Ladan Akbarnia, who organized a smaller version of the exhibition last summer at the Brooklyn Museum. The first exhibit at the MFAH to be devoted to Sufism, it features mosque lighting furnishings ; attributes and representations of Sufi mystics; illustrated, illuminated and laser-etched manuscripts of Sufi poetry; and contemporary works inspired by Sufi principles and practices. The objects date from the ninth century to the present.

For example, an untitled 1998 etching by Pouran Jinchi, an Iranian-born, New York-based artist, quotes verses by the 14th-century poet Shams al-Din Muhammad Hafiz-i Shirazi but arranges the words in a swirling composition of contorted strokes.

Including contemporary art in the mix was an unconventional choice. What is traditionally called Islamic art dates from the beginning of Islam in 622 to the 1920s, which witnessed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the Qajar dynasty.

“For whatever reason, academics are kind of reluctant in talking about an Islamic artistic tradition after these big empires’ fall,” Leoni said. “But the question is: OK, what defines Islamic? How do you use this term? And hasn’t the Islamic world continued to produce art that is ultimately inspired by Islamic ideas or inspired by Islamic visual practices that had been rooted and developed in the centuries before? That’s what (Akbarnia) was, in a way, trying to challenge by incorporating works by contemporary artists.”

Another bone of contention is Sufism’s place within Islam.

“It developed as a sort of heterodox form of devotion, which did not always respect the limits of orthodoxy,” Leoni said. “The most fundamentalist fringes of Islam may be the least inclined to recognize this phenomenon as part of Islam altogether. So there is an ambivalent attitude toward Sufism, but I can assure you that probably 90 percent of Muslims would recognize this experience as the mystical side of Islam, much as Christians (recognize) monasticism, which took forms that were not necessarily (widely) shared.”

The exhibit takes light — symbolizing both God and enlightenment — as its overarching theme while exploring how Sufi ideas are physically embodied by artworks or affect their production. For example, the verses in a ninth- or 10th-century Folio fromthe “Blue Qur'an” are written in gold on blue parchment, creating a luminous effect. A 14th-century mosque lamp is inscribed with part of Ayat al-Nur, which is known as “the Light Verse” of the Quran.

It also includes depictions of various Sufi mystics including Whirling Dervishes, whose prayer and ritual dances produce rhythmic movements and ecstatic moods meant to bring practitioners closer to God.

Light of the Sufis exhibit explores Islam’s mystical side, Houston Chronicle, May 13 2010

 
“Though based in Mali, Ansar Dine is a truly transnational outfit. Ag Ghaly allegedly received Salafist religious training from Pakistani “missionaries” in northern Mali in the 1990s, views that were abandoned then rekindled during his diplomatic service in Saudi Arabia years later. Ansar Dine is believed to be financially backed by Qatar, and the group is believed to draw its membership from a range of nations including Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Afghanistan and Algeria. Global in reach, Ansar Dine recently brought its efforts online by releasing a propaganda video and establishing a presence in jihadist chat rooms.”

Who is Ansar Dine? – Global Public Square - CNN.com Blogs [Aug 14th 2012]

I don’t really find credible? reports on Libyan Salafi linkage with Qatar or Saudi Arabia. 

But re: Ansar Dine in Northern Mali (Azawad) - CNN has this paragraph.

August 27, 2012, 1:59pm  2 notes

▸ [North Africa, Islam, Libya, Senussi] Re: Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali as-Senussi (1787–1859)

Below 3 paragraphs are really impressive (to me) that how energetic? and independent-thinking/minded this founder of Senussi movement was. 

He was born in Algeria and then goes to Morocco, then keep moving - and then Egypt - then hits the issues of conservatism vs. adaptive? interpretation - 

and then creating ‘local’ religious-political support. 

Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali as-Senussi (1787–1859), the founder of the order, was born in Algeria near Mostaganem and was named al-Senussi after a venerated Muslim teacher. He was a member of the Walad Sidi Abdalla tribe, and was a sharif tracing his descent from Fatimah, the daughter of Mohammed. He studied at a madrassa in Fez, then traveled in the Sahara preaching a purifying reform of the faith in Tunisia and Tripoli, gaining many adherents, and then moved to Cairo to study atAl-Azhar University. The pious scholar was forceful in his criticism of the Egyptian ulema for what he perceived as their timid compliance with the Ottoman authorities and their spiritual conservatism. He also argued that learned Muslims should not blindly follow the four classical schools of Islamic law but instead engage in ijtihad themselves. Not surprisingly, he was opposed by the ulema as unorthodox and they issued a fatwa against him.

Senussi went to Mecca, where he joined Ahmad Ibn Idris al-Fasi, the head of the Khadirites, a religious fraternity of Moroccan origin. On the death of Al-Fasi, Senussi became head of one of the two branches into which the Khadirites divided, and in 1835 he founded his first monastery or zawia, at Abu Kobeis near Mecca. Due to Wahhabi pressure Senussi left Mecca and settled in Cyrenaica, Libya in 1843, where in the mountains near Sidi Rafaa’(Bayda) he built the Zawia Baida (“White Monastery”). There he was supported by the local tribes and the Sultan of Wadai and his connections extended across the Maghreb.

The Grand Senussi did not tolerate fanaticism and forbade the use of stimulants as well as voluntary poverty. Lodge members were to eat and dress within the limits of Islamic law and, instead of depending on charity, were required to earn their living through work. He accepted neither the wholly intuitive ways described by some Sufi mystics nor the rationality of some the orthodox ulema; rather, he attempted to achieve a middle path. The Bedouin tribes had shown no interest in the ecstatic practices of the Sufis that were gaining adherents in the towns, but they were attracted in great numbers to the Senussis. The relative austerity of the Senussi message was particularly suited to the character of the Cyrenaican Bedouins, whose way of life had not changed much in the centuries since the Arabs had first accepted the Prophet Mohammad’s teachings.



Source: Wikipedia

Aug 27, 2012, 12:40pm  0 notes      

▸ Senussi - Wikipedia

Yeah, it’s hard to characterize simply as ‘mostly Sunni’ - and just saying 'Sufi’ also - is impossible in West because there is certain established image of Sufism here.

The Senussi or Sanussi refers to a Muslim political-religious order in Libya and the Sudan region founded in Mecca in 1837 by the Grand Senussi, Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali as-Senussi. Senussi was concerned with both the decline of Islamic thought and spirituality and the weakening of Muslim political integrity. From 1902 to 1913 the Senussi fought French expansion in the Sahara, and the Italian colonisation of Libya beginning in 1911. In World War I, the Senussi fought against the British in Egypt and Sudan. The Grand Senussi’s grandson became King Idris of Libya in 1951. In 1969, King Idris I was overthrown by a military coup led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. A third of the population in Libya continue to be affiliated with the Senussi movement.

Also

cf: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idris_bin_Abdullah_al-Senussi

and

The Senussis, who ruled Libya between 1951 and 1969, are a rare example of an indigenous dynasty which emerged on the back of genuine popular support. That support, however, was stronger in Cyrenaica than in Tripolitania: the arguments that attended the adoption of the first Libyan constitution were largely between eastern and western delegates, with the former seeking to give the king greater power, and the latter wanting a powerful national assembly. In some senses, the fighting of recent months was simply a re-emergence of those ancient fault lines: opposition supporters, based in Cyrenaica, flew the old royal standard and carried pictures of King Idris. Gaddafi’s support was overwhelmingly in the west.

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/100101868/dont-assume-the-worst-about-the-new-libyan-regime/



Aug 27, 2012, 12:31pm  0 notes      

 
“Historically, most Libyans follow Sufi teachings. Salafis don’t have widespread appeal or followers in Libya, and many Libyans see their Islamic teachings as a foreign import from the Arab Gulf countries.”

- WSJ 

Is this due to America’s Neocon types wanting to manufacture Sufism’s image - (Neocon and WSJ being rather close) - or - something hard to characterize appropriately? 

But I did read Libyans mostly follow Sunni Islam etc. *I really haven’t dug up authentic sources on this. 

August 27, 2012, 12:10pm  1 note

▸ [Libya, Salafists, Sufism] Attacks on Shrines Rattle Libya, WSJ

So a Libyan Salafi group

  • has coordinations with Libyan security forces (though Libyan security forces etc are not yet under unified command from the central government.)
  • can bring in bulldozers
  • can spend entire day for demolishing a historic Sufi shrine (or two)
  • and later congratulate on Facebook page. 

image

And by the way, that’s usually called demolition machine - I think.

Though I don’t know this is authentic photo or not yet. 

*Photo seems authentic and here is a short video of demolition’s beginning.

Libya’s newly elected congress held an emergency session on Sunday about the destruction over the weekend of two of the country’s most revered Sufi shrines by suspected religious extremists, who some lawmakers allege may have undertaken their actions in collusion with security officials.

The brazen attacks in two cities underscore the shaky nature of the emerging democracy in Libya, where elected officials have little sway over security forces. The destruction has raised fears that conservative religious groups—whose candidates were soundly beaten in the country’s July election—may attempt to sabotage Libya’s transition to a secular, modern state.

At sunrise on Saturday, suspected Libyan adherents of the rigid Salafi school of Islam brought bulldozers into the center of Tripoli and flattened the expansive, centuries-old Sidi Al-Sha'ab shrine. Uniformed members of at least two separate government security divisions that answer to the Interior Ministry barricaded the busy seafront road where the religious complex was located and allowed the daylong demolition to continue, according to witnesses.

[…]

The new congress doesn’t have direct oversight of the myriad security forces that presently exist, and it is unclear how closely the security agencies follow the chain of command presented by the departing group of transitional ministers. The ministers have held their posts since December as part of an interim government.

Libyan Sufi scholars allege that the religious extremists have taken advantage of the power vacuum to violently impose their religious dictates on society. At least three other Sufi shrines have been vandalized in the past nine months, in addition to the two over the weekend.

Historically, most Libyans follow Sufi teachings. Salafis don’t have widespread appeal or followers in Libya, and many Libyans see their Islamic teachings as a foreign import from the Arab Gulf countries.

When news of the bulldozing spread through the capital on Saturday morning, several Tripoli residents who live near the Sidi Al-Sha'ab shrine complex succeeded in breaking through the security cordon to try to intervene and stop the destruction.

These residents said the men organizing the demolition had Libyan accents and were wearing long white tunics and hats favored by Islamic theology students. The men described themselves as students, though they declined to identify themselves or the institution where they were studying, according to two residents.

The religious students told passersby that the shrine and adjoining mosque were places of “witchcraft,” according to one resident who said he was later forcibly removed from the demolition site by security officials.

Three employees of Libyan private TV channel Al Assema were detained by Libyan security forces Saturday evening when the channel aired pictures of the forces who had surrounded the shrine complex and allowed the destruction to continue, the TV channel said. The journalists were released without charge after several hours, it said.

Tripoli’s Al Sha'ab mosque and shrine housed close to 50 Sufi graves, including the tomb of Libyan Sufi scholar Abdullah al-Sha'ab, who died in the 16th century.

On Friday, attackers razed the revered resting place of Abdel Salam al-Asmar in Zlitan, about 160 kilometers, or 90 miles, west of the capital, and set fire to the historic adjoining library.

A Facebook page titled “Together for the Removal of the Abdel Salam al-Asmar Shrine” congratulated the people responsible for the attacks for the “successful removal of the Asmar shrine, the largest sign of idolatry in Libya.”



Source: The Wall Street Journal

Aug 27, 2012, 11:44am  3 notes      

▸ [Egypt, Islam] The battle for al-Azhar, H. A. Hellyer, Foreign Policy

Egypt expert H. A. Hellyer’s take on recent moves re: Egypt’s religious institution (Morsi appointing a Salafi person as a religious minister ***this appointment was dropped) - esp re: Al-Azhar. 

Whether Al-Azhar is actually ‘independent’ or not (wasn’t it protected and backed by Mubarak regime to counter Brotherhood and Salafis? Also, consider its moves and gestures against Shia minority and Shia proselytization within Egypt) - it is a telling point to read from how sectarian pressures/rivalries within Islam is devised and shifting. 

… culturally, Sufism is as ingrained into the traditional Muslim culture of Egypt as it is in the Azhar establishment.

But many Egyptians nonetheless have reservations about the Azhar’s structural flaws, the drop in educational standards, and the overall lack of faith in public educational institutions due to poor government policies. These have resulted in a substantial number of graduates, and even faculty, who are ignorant of its historical creed, as well as those actively opposed to it. Moreover, the deconstruction of much of its independence from the state, begun under former President Gamal Abdel Nasser but continued under successive administrations, has damaged the credibility of the Azhar domestically as well as internationally. Its firm institutional stance against al Qaeda-style radicalism worldwide, however, has overshadowed much of that criticism. Moreover, non-Islamist political forces consider the Azhar to be a bulwark against the more politicized MB or the puritanical purist Salafis who seek to dominate the post January 25 religious space.

Al-Azhar has taken center stage at several key moments in the revolution. The first was the day after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak when Sheikh al-Azhar announced that Azhar scholars would choose his successor, and any other successor after that, instead of the president of the republic. This followed long-standing criticism that Al-Azhar suffered from reliance on the state, and enjoyed little independence vis-à-vis the regime. The next moment came with the issuance of a constitutional principles document, which was built on the basis of consensus with many different political forces in society, with Al-Azhar acting as the convener. Not long thereafter, nearly every political and civil force in the country declared Al-Azhar, including the MB and most Salafi movements, to be the “Islamic frame of reference.” These moves gave many Egyptians hope that Al-Azhar would recover its independence from the state, and speak truth to power when the situation called for it.

The new round of controversy began when a well-known Salafi cleric tweeted that he had been approached by Prime Minister Hisham Qandil to be the new minister of religious endowments, and had accepted the post. Such a new minister could encourage the official propagation of Salafism on the grassroots level through the imams and mosques under the ministry’s control, rather than maintain the traditional Azhari approach. There were other unconfirmed reports that the new government was considering appointing a MB leader as mufti in due course – another key role within the religious establishment of the Egyptian republic. The next logical and final step would be to install a Salafi in the role of Sheikh al-Azhar. Or to put it another way: to “Salafize” Al-Azhar’s establishment leadership.

The response of the Al-Azhar was firm: public denouncements were made, with letters being released to the press that indicated the opposition from within Al-Azhar to the proposed appointment. In the end, it was an Azhari who was appointed officially today, as the result of Al-Azhar’s pressure. In taking their criticism public, Al-Azhar stayed within the realm of legitimate civil activity for non-state actors in the new Egypt. What complicates matters are the reports that Sheikh Al-Azhar went to the leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to express his disapproval at the appointment. A couple of days later, it was clear that the new government had backed down – but possibly at the expense of Al-Azhar being indebted to the armed forces for intervention in a civil and religious affair.

There are difficult times ahead for Al-Azhar’s establishment. There appear to be three options for it, the first being the obvious one of sacrificing its independence from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements, and allow the “Salafizing” of the establishment to take place. As noted above, this has serious implications. The second would be to align with the non-civil forces in the deep state whose aim is to minimize MB and Salafi influence in Egypt, which would also involve sacrificing its independence in the process. The more difficult route would be to chart another course, where it is engaged in critique of both the deep state and the MB. This would be, of course, the path chosen by individual prominent Azharis, such as Sheikh Emad Effat, who was popularly recognized as the “Sheikh of the Revolution.” He was killed in the midst of clashes with military forces on Cairo’s streets in December 2011.

Many questions remain. Did the first post-Mubarak, civilian led government consider changing the religious establishment in this manner, especially with this kind of appointment? Does this represent a deepening of influence of purist Salafism within the Muslim Brotherhood? Does the MB intend to use its partisan political power in the future to accomplish “religious engineering” within Egypt? Is that a role that any Egyptian political power should have? But also –will Al-Azhar University withstand the pressures in this new religious space, and if so, how? Is it equipped to maintain its current official creed and simultaneously increase its independence from the state, calling its institutions and leaders to account when the situation calls for it? Clearly, the Egyptian revolution is not over yet, and its outcome will not only affect Egypt.



Source: mideast.foreignpolicy.com

Aug 02, 2012, 9:08pm  2 notes      

▸ [Egypt] Egypt Azhar counselor rejects Salafist religious endowments minister, Al Ahram

The issue/tension started here.

And now reaction from Al Azhar and Egyptian Sufis:

A number of religious figures and groups add their signatures on Sunday to a statement opposing the appointment of the Salafist Mohamed Yosri Ibrahim as minister of religious endowments (awqaf).

The statement was initially released by a group of Sufis (a spiritual brand of Islam) and moderate religious groups on Saturday criticising the choice of Ibrahim and describing it as a threat to Egypt’s “moderate Islam.”

The statement was signed Sunday morning by more religious groups, including the counselor of the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Abdel Dayem Nosseir, and the Sufi Scholars Union headed by Hassan El-Shafei.

Ibrahim revealed on his Twitter account on Friday that he accepted the ministerial post following his meeting with Prime Minister Hisham Qandil.

The newly-appoitned premier has been in continuous meetings to form a cabinet, which he is set to announce on Thursday.



Source: english.ahram.org.eg

Jul 30, 2012, 2:14am  1 note      

“Very bad for Sufis+Small Shia community” - Michael Wahid Hanna
Re: Egypt: the news that Salafist Yosri Ibrahim is appointed as a Minister of Awqaf (“The ministry regulates mosques and is responsible for the issuing of licenses to preachers.”) due to...

“Very bad for Sufis+Small Shia community” - Michael Wahid Hanna

Re: Egypt: the news that Salafist Yosri Ibrahim is appointed as a Minister of Awqaf (“The ministry regulates mosques and is responsible for the issuing of licenses to preachers.”) due to Ibrahim’s close relation with Brotherhood top El-Shater. 

Additionally, what is possible to interpret from this - is that Egypt’s Brotherhood is able to - is willing to - embrace Salafi/Wahhabi doctrines. 

And steadfast on pushing to implement them. (Though there is SCAF/Deep State - watching and *timing* all the counter moves. But how it’s going to be actually - just have to wait and see.) 

 
“Former MP Mohamed Abu Hamed, known for his anti-Islamist stance, slammed the news of Ibrahim’s appointment describing it as a proof of the Muslim Brotherhood’s embrace of Wahhabi thinking.

He predicted Wahhabi preaching will spread in mosques across Egypt, and that Wahhabi Islam does not believe in democracy and can only rule with the enforcement of fascist dictatorship.”

July 28, 2012, 8:48pm  3 notes

▸ [Egypt] A Salafist Appointed as Minister of Mosque Regulation and Preacher License. Egypt's Sufi, Moderates react. Ahram Online

This can be scary. Though have to watch how it develops. (Or it bound to lead to tension and collision.) 

Point: One idea here is Egypt’s Brotherhood is capable of embracing Salafi/Wahabi doctrines. 

And if Brotherhood and Salafi unleash their spontaneous momentum - they could try at Al Azhar. I don’t know it gets to that stage - or it takes more of ‘politics’ before such drastic thing can take place. 

News that Salafist Mohamed Ibrahim has been chosen as Minister of Awqaf evokes fear of threats to Egypt’s moderate religious identity; critics say he was picked because of his strong relations to MB leader, Khairat El-Shater

A number of religious and political figures expressed their discontent with the appointment of Mohamed Yosri Ibrahim as minister of religious endowments – Awqaf – in the new cabinet, voicing fears that this heralds an imposition of Wahabbism, a Saudi-influenced conservative form of Islam.

According to a statement issued by a number of Sufis and moderate religious groups, the choice of Ibrahim, a member of the Salafist Call, to head the Ministry of Awqaf will negatively influence Egypt cultural and religious identity. The ministry regulates mosques and is responsible for the issuing of licenses to preachers.

In the statement the groups stressed that their efforts in fending off what they saw as a Wahhabi influence will not be limited to statements. They further accused Ibrahim of denying doctrines of Al-Azhar in his writing. Al-Azhar is widely perceived as a moderate religious institute, and the main centre of Islamic education in the world.

Mohamed Ibrahim who received his PhD from Al-Azhar revealed on Friday on his official twitter account that he accepted to head the Ministry of Awqaf following a meeting with newly appointed prime minister Hisham Qandil.

Qandil has indicated that the new cabinet will be announced on Thursday.

Islamist liberal activist Ibrahim El-Hodaiby also used his Facebook page to express his disapproval, pointing out that Ibrahim had failed to win a seat the parliamentary elections last winter when he was running on the list of Al-Asala Salafist party.

El-Hodaiby further claimed that Ibrahim’s presence in both the Constituent Assembly and now his appointment as Minister of Awqaf are due to his strong relations with one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading figures.

Meanwhile, Ibrahim used Twitter to deny claims that he won the post because of his good relations with highly influential Muslim Brotherhood figure Khairat El-Shater.

El-Hodaiby also accused Ibrahim of dressing in the garb of Al-Azhar scholars, fooling people that he is a moderate man, while in fact he fights its principles and embraces Salafist ideologies.

Ibrahim confirmed his respect for the entity of Al-Azhar and the role it played in his own education, adding that sectarian differences does not mean disrespect of the other.

Former MP Mohamed Abu Hamed, known for his anti-Islamist stance, slammed the news of Ibrahim’s appointment describing it as a proof of the Muslim Brotherhood’s embrace of Wahhabi thinking. He predicted Wahhabi preaching will spread in mosques across Egypt, and that Wahhabi Islam does not believe in democracy and can only rule with the enforcement of fascist dictatorship.

Meanwhile, a member of the dissolved parliament Mostafa Al-Naggar who defeated Ibrahim in the last parliamentary elections congratulated him for the new post on his twitter account.

In 2011, Ibrahim was one of many Salafist preachers who claimed that a woman Camilia Shehata was kidnapped by the church for converting to Islam, feeding sectarian tensions. Salafists led a number of protests demanding the release of Shehata who later gave a televised interview refuting any claims that she had converted.



Source: english.ahram.org.eg

Jul 28, 2012, 8:41pm  0 notes      

re: Quakerism and Sufism

Quakerism starts in England - around 1643. *And it doesn’t hesitate to think and claim in words that -  'state of corruption within Christianity lasted 1600 years. 

You have already heard that the Quakers date from Christ, who, according to them, was the first Quaker. Religion, say these, was corrupted a little after His death, and remained in that state of corruption about sixteen hundred years. But there were always a few Quakers concealed in the world, who carefully preserved the sacred fire, which was extinguished in all but themselves, until at last this light spread itself in England in 1642.

It was at the time when Great Britain was torn to pieces by the intestine wars which three or four sects had raised in the name of God, that one George Fox, born in Leicestershire, and son to a silk weaver, took it into his head to preach, and, as he pretended, with all the requisites of a true apostle—that is, without being able either to read or write. He was about twenty-five years of age, irreproachable in his life and conduct, and a holy madman. He was equipped in leather from head to foot, and travelled from one village to another, exclaiming against war and the clergy. Had his invectives been levelled against the soldiery only he would have been safe enough, but he inveighed against ecclesiastics. Fox was seized at Derby, and being carried before a justice of peace, he did not once offer to pull off his leathern hat, upon which an officer gave him a great box of the ear, and cried to him, “Don’t you know you are to appear uncovered before his worship?” Fox presented his other cheek to the officer, and begged him to give him another box for God’s sake.

Letters on English, Letter III, 1733, Voltaire 

Then, 17th century - South Asia. The case of Sarmad Kashani:

The tomb of Sarmad the Armenian, a storied Sufi saint, sits close to Delhi’s Great Mosque. Sarmad looked for unity within Muslim and Hindu theology, and famously walked the streets of Lahore and Delhi naked, denouncing corrupt nobles and clerics. In 1661, he was arrested for heresy and beheaded under the orders of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, a ruler admired now by Pakistani hard-liners for his championing of an orthodox Islam and the destruction of hundreds of Hindu temples. As Sarmad was led to his execution, he was heard to mutter lines of poetry: “There was an uproar, and we opened our eyes from eternal sleep,” intoned the Sufi. “Saw that the night of wickedness endured, so we slept again.” 

Source: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1912091,00.html

cf: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarmad_Kashani

cf:http://www.poetry-chaikhana.com/S/Sarmad/

That brings up the subject of Faqir - 

And Wikipedia has this funny? section - though it starts to sound like a collection of folklore and - more like recent, unsophisticated attempts on (arm chair) new age, spiritual metaphysics (latter I personally don’t buy.)

The attributes of faqir and faqr have been defined by many Muslim saints and scholars, however, some significant definitions from distinguished personalities of Islam are quoted here.

One of the most respected and beloved early Muslim saints Abdul-Qadir Gilani also elaborated Sufism,tasawwuf and faqr in a conclusive manner. Explaining attributes of faqir, he says, “faqir is not who can not do anything and is nothing in his self-being. But faqir has all the commanding powers (gifted from Allah) and his orders can not be revoked.”

Then Ibn Arabi explained Sufism, including faqr in more details. He wrote more than 500 books on topics relating toSufismtasawwuf and faqr. He was the first Muslim scholar who introduced (first time openly) the idea of Wahdat al-wujud which remained the talk of the town for many centuries.

Another dignified Muslim saint Sultan Bahoo describes a faqir as one, “who has been entrusted with full authority from Allah (God)”. At another place, in the same book Sultan Bahoo says,“Faqir attains eternity by dissolving himself in oneness of Allah. He, when, eliminates his-self from other than Allah, his soul reaches to divinity." He further says in his other book, "faqir has three steps (stages). First step he takes from eternity (without beginning) to this mortal world, second step from this finite world to hereafter and last step he takes from hereafter to manifestation of Allah”.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faqir#Attributes

July 17, 2012, 12:46pm   1 note

Creating Alert on Sufi and Sufism -

was the best thing for studying Islam by so far. 

Away from this ‘Political Islam’ (much of Sunni and Shia today, actually) - and also more sedentary, excessively-text/quote-based type of (modern, urban, individualistic, Western) Islam - I’m exposed to much more relaxed and wider materials maintained by actually living average kind of people. (Really helping me to even vaguely, to make more sense out of experiences I had in UK - with Pakistani/Kashmiri/Bangladesh people.) 

And there appears to be established scholarship and academic(?) approaches - for studying recent history and current situations and efforts of designated as 'Sufi’ area or spaces within the geography of Islam - (There are less political tensions and toxicity. Also, one can be more defensive? or un-apologisitic?- or just simply positive about materials. ***There is a risk to this for sure. Nothing is perfect. But does a religion or a people has to be perfect really???)

And even - I can see and sense how inspirations and lessons from this contemporary scholarship are channeled back to more regular type of regional or political studies and research. 

It’s never should be like my Spinoza (idol A) is better than your Nietzsche (Idol B). 

(That kind of toxicity and tension - is rather unnecessary for most of the positions.

We tout this very often. 

But actually seeing, getting to materials which really makes you feel like this - and re-framing many questions and experiences in your head - 

that’s actually happening is really - the best gain happening right now.) 

  • Will try bringing in more such materials - and researches here!
  • [Right now it’s just starting and forming initial stage]
July 14, 2012, 3:15am   1 note
▸ Making Space: Sufis and Settlers in Early Modern India (by Nile Green) [‘transnational’ links of Sufis in the making of Muslim space on Indian soil]

By Vikhar Ahmed Sayeed, Frontline (The Hindu)

  • Review on “Making Space: Sufis and Settlers in Early Modern India’ (Oxford University Press, 2012), Nile Green (UCLA, Central Asia & Middle East)

For more than a thousand years, there has been a constant theological wrangling on the position of Sufis within Islam. Puritans have always argued that the tombs of Sufis that are converted into shrines ( dargahs) are locations where Islam is corrupted and where bid’at (innovation) creeps into the practice of the religion. On the other hand, other prominent Muslims in South Asia and in other parts of the world have consistently argued that these practices have religious sanction and draw legitimacy from the Quran.

The arguments in favour of the sacerdotal practices at Sufi shrines received a fillip in South Asia with the aggressive theological work of Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that most Indian Muslims are Barelwis (followers of Barelwi), but there has been an increasing tendency within Indian Islam, under a global move to homogenise the faith, to conform to a more Wahabi version of Sunni Islam. The first consequence of this global move has been the reduced patronage of the various Sufi shrines in the subcontinent.

Thus, the person of the Sufi and, concomitantly, the shrine where he has been physically and spiritually immortalised have emerged as the key sites where these theological battles are fought between the traditionalists and the reformers. Recently formed organisations such as the All India Ulama and Mashaikh Board (AIUMB), comprising mainly sajjada nashins (descendants of Sufis), have tried to organise themselves against the overarching influence of the Deoband madrassa and its discourse of Sunni Islam on Muslims in the subcontinent.

In the context of this tremendous churn in Indian Muslim society and the internecine battle among India’s Sunni Muslims, the academic relevance of Nile Green’s new book of integrated essays, Making Space: Sufis and Settlers in Early Modern India, is invaluable as it provides a useful account of the roles of Sufis in early modern India. Of course, it also has a wider relevance for students of Indian history, historians of religion, students of migration studies, discerning intellectuals and anybody who has an interest in the world of Sufis.

As the work of historians such as Richard M. Eaton has demonstrated, Sufis have played a key role in the spread of Islamic culture (and concomitantly Islam) in South Asia. In the later centuries, Sufi shrines were also powerful economic institutions that played important political roles. Therefore, in-depth studies of Sufism in India are absolutely necessary to add to our understanding of South Asian Islam. Green’s work, which looks at the world of Sufis in early modern India with several case studies from the Deccan, adds significantly to this understanding of Sufis’ role. The integrated essays in this collection look at several facets of Sufis’ lives and the roles they played in early modern Indian society.

Studies of Indian Islam tend to restrict their inquiries to the limited geography of the subcontinent, but Green’s work demonstrates the “transnational” links of Sufis. This is the key aspect he chooses to address – how settlement emerged from a “world on the move”, as historians described medieval Islamic India. With their settlements, Green argues, “Sufis were the key mediators between the new Muslim communities that emerged in early modern India and the rural landscape and urban spaces of their settlement and homemaking.” He goes on to say that “…the shrines of the immortalised Sufi saints were crucial to the making of Muslim space on Indian soil”.

Green approaches the itinerant world of Sufis by positioning the texts and territories that they inhabited in their double lives as blessed men and remembered saints. He writes: “For the purpose of this book, what is ultimately most important to recognise is that blessed men and saints were at once territorial and textual constructions who were created by and in turn created texts and territories.”

The Persian texts that Sufis brought with them from their homes in central Asia were their links with a larger Islamic world, in the process creating Muslim “communities of memory”. The territories that they inhabited in India or passed through acquired a sacred geography and in the process marked, claimed and transformed India’s landscape into homelands. Green writes: “Through the movement of Sufis to India, an interconnected and overlapping Muslim geography emerged that connected India with wider Muslim memory space.”

The textual repertoire that Sufis brought with them was the source for practices like the urs (the death anniversary of a Sufi saint celebrated at his shrine). Green demonstrates the extraterritorial (outside South Asia) lineage of this practice, locating it in early Islam, and argues that it was part of the high Islamic South Asian religious practice.

Sufis were great travellers and Green uses the phrase “mobile blessed men” to describe them. They travelled along with armies and merchants. Several Sufis had also come from the modern region of Afghanistan, and for a group like the Afghans, whose identity was formed only among the diaspora, the Afghan saint acted as the “anchor of memory” by preserving cultural memory and linking the territories to which Afghans migrated. As the Afghan diaspora seeped more into the cultural and cosmopolitan fabric of India, the Afghans also began to patronise non-Afghan Sufis during the time of Mughal rule in India.

The travel of these Sufis to remote lands helped people settle there and patronise the Sufi, and subsequently the shrine, in a sort of symbiotic relationship between the Sufi and the community that had sprouted around him. In this way, Sufis were central in creating new Muslim homelands and they also helped in the process of gradual conversion. Islam was a religion fixed in geographical origin, and Sufi shrines linked Arabian geographies of the Quran’s text to their Islam in a variety of ways, thus “…helping in the acculturation of local converts to a religion that was fixed in geographical origin”.



Jul 14, 2012, 3:01am  0 notes