- Well, current non-proliferation regime, NPT (codes and clauses on papers) are very imperfect
- Executing/implementing agency (IAEA) is also - not so thorough
- Many loop holes
- also (too) many problems at reinforcement
Then in that ‘slack’ or very loose regulative environment, thus very political, and psychological question is that: Can West allow Iran’s nuclear development programs?
Probably answer is ‘Not really’.
(It’s loose. There many loop holes and shortfalls. However, this can’t really support the argument that Iran’s case also should be tolerated.)
Then why not revise and reinforce NPT - why not have a new, more stringent global non-proliferation treaty and enforcement regime? Answer is: it is pretty much impossible to achieve agreement for such thing among major powerful nuclear states (including proliferation sources such as Russia, China).
Then, in all this, it’s probably too timid and cynical to characterize Iran’s case as ‘Iran is just pursuing peaceful civilian capacity’. Rather Iran is surely exploiting loopholes - and its aim is to advance toward ‘nuclear weapon ready’ stage as much as possible. Getting to all necessary know-hows. Stockpiling and securing uranium fuels as much as possible.
But then, I have to recall who said this - 'If Iran is really determined to acquire nuclear weapon, no one outside will be really able to stop that from happening'.
The world’s reactions have been too late. That’s obvious from how informal/underground nuclear proliferation networks have been tolerated to operate globally. North Korea. Pakistan. Then of course there is no reason why Iran cannot just follow the same pattern.